| Description: |
The SUSE Linux Enterprise 12 SP3 TD kernel was updated to receive various security and bugfixes.
The following security bugs were fixed:
- CVE-2021-22555: A heap out-of-bounds write affecting Linux since v2.6.19-rc1 was discovered in net/netfilter/x_tables.c (bnc#1188116 ). - CVE-2021-33909: Extremely large seq buffer allocations in seq_file could lead to buffer underruns and code execution (bsc#1188062). - CVE-2021-3609: A use-after-free in can/bcm could have led to privilege escalation (bsc#1187215). - CVE-2021-0605: In pfkey_dump of af_key.c, there is a possible out-of-bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local information disclosure in the kernel with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation (bnc#1187601). - CVE-2021-0512: In __hidinput_change_resolution_multipliers of hid-input.c, there is a possible out of bounds write due to a heap buffer overflow. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation (bnc#1187595). - CVE-2021-34693: net/can/bcm.c allowed local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory because parts of a data structure are uninitialized (bnc#1187452 ). - CVE-2020-36385: drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c had a use-after-free because the ctx is reached via the ctx_list in some ucma_migrate_id situations where ucma_close is called, aka CID-f5449e74802c (bnc#1187050). - CVE-2021-0129: Improper access control in BlueZ may have allowed an authenticated user to potentially enable information disclosure via adjacent access (bnc#1186463 ). - CVE-2020-26558: Bluetooth LE and BR/EDR secure pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification 2.1 may permit a nearby man-in-the-middle attacker to identify the Passkey used during pairing (in the Passkey authentication procedure) by reflection of the public key and the authentication evidence of the initiating device, potentially permitting this attacker to complete authenticated pairing with the responding device using the correct Passkey for the pairing session. The attack methodology determines the Passkey value one bit at a time (bnc#1179610 bnc#1186463 ).
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